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I. 
 In March 2015, the Boards of Penn State Hershey 
Medical Center and PinnacleHealth System (“Hershey” and 
“Pinnacle,” respectively) formally approved a plan to merge.  
They had announced the proposal a year earlier, so the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) were already investigating the impact 
of the proposed merger when the Boards approved it.  This 
joint probe resulted in the FTC filing an administrative 
complaint alleging that the merger violated Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act.1  The FTC scheduled an administrative hearing 
on the merits for May 2016.  At the same time, the 
Commonwealth and the FTC jointly sued Hershey and 
Pinnacle under Section 16 of the Clayton Act,2 and Section 
13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”),3 to 
“prevent and restrain Hershey and Pinnacle from violating 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act . . . pending the Commission’s 
administrative proceeding.”4  They sought a preliminary 
injunction and a temporary restraining order. 
 
 The District Court denied relief.5  But, on September 
27, 2016, we reversed the District Court’s order and directed 
it to preliminarily enjoin the merger “pending the outcome of 
                                              
1 15 U.S.C. § 18.   
2 15 U.S.C. § 26. 
3 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). 
4 Amended Complaint at 7 ¶ 14, FTC v. Penn State Hershey 
Med. Ctr., 185 F. Supp. 3d 552 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (No. 1:15-
cv-2362) (“Hershey I”). 
5 Hershey I, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 564. 
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the FTC’s administrative adjudication.”6  Within three weeks, 
Hershey and Pinnacle terminated their Agreement, 
referencing our remand ordering the temporary injunction as 
the impetus.  The District Court ultimately issued the 
injunction on October 20, 2016.   
 
The Commonwealth then moved for attorneys’ fees 
and costs, asserting that it “substantially prevailed” under 
Section 16 of the Clayton Act, but the District Court denied 
the motion.7  In doing so, the District Court rejected 
Hershey’s and Pinnacle’s argument that the Commonwealth 
could not seek attorneys’ fees and costs under Section 16 of 
the Clayton Act because, in ordering the injunction, we 
applied Section 13(b) of the FTC Act instead.  The District 
Court denied the fee request, however, because the 
Commonwealth had not “substantially prevailed” under 
Section 16 of the Clayton Act.  The Commonwealth timely 
appealed.  We will affirm, because we credit Hershey’s and 
Pinnacle’s argument that we ordered the injunction based on 
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, not Section 16 of the Clayton 
Act. 
 
II. 
                                              
6 FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 354 
(3d Cir. 2016) (“Hershey II”).   
7 FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., No. 1:15-cv-2362, 
2017 WL 1954398, at *9 (M.D. Pa. May 11, 2017) (“Hershey 
III”). 
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 Ordinarily, we review the District Court’s denial of 
attorneys’ fees for abuse of discretion.8  As explained below, 
however, our decision turns on the legal question as to which 
statute applies.  Our review of that legal question is plenary.9 
 
III. 
 The American Rule, grounded in longstanding 
common law tradition, requires parties to pay their own legal 
costs “win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides 
otherwise.”10  One such statute is Section 16 of the Clayton 
Act.  That section provides in relevant part: 
 
Any person, firm, corporation, or 
association shall be entitled to sue 
for and have injunctive relief, in 
any court of the United States 
having jurisdiction over the 
parties, against threatened loss or 
damage by a violation of the 
antitrust laws  . . . . In any action 
under this section in which the 
plaintiff substantially prevails, the 
court shall award the cost of suit, 
including a reasonable attorney’s 
fee, to such plaintiff.11   
                                              
8 Raab v. City of Ocean City, 833 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 
2016). 
9 See id. 
10 Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 
(2015).   
11 15 U.S.C. § 26. 
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The District Court concluded that the Commonwealth 
did not “substantially prevail” under this section for two 
reasons.  First, the District Court ruled that the termination of 
the merger did not render the Commonwealth a prevailing 
party because the injunction itself did not terminate the 
merger and, even though the injunction motivated Hershey 
and Pinnacle to do so on their own, the Supreme Court has 
rejected the “catalyst theory” of prevailing-party status.12  
Second, the District Court determined that, because our ruling 
was based on the holding that the Commonwealth and FTC 
were merely likely to succeed on the merits, our ruling was 
not a grant of relief “on the merits” as required for prevailing-
party status by Singer Management Consultants, Inc. v. 
Milgram.13  
 
The Commonwealth contests both conclusions.  But 
Hershey and Pinnacle argue that we need not address them 
because Section 16 of the Clayton Act and its attorneys’ fees 
provision do not apply at all.  Hershey and Pinnacle contend 
that the preliminary injunction on which the Commonwealth 
relies for its claim of attorneys’ fees was not entered “in an 
action under this section” as required for application of 
Section 16 of the Clayton Act.  Instead, they argue, the 
injunction was issued under the authority of Section 13(b) of 
the FTC Act, which does not provide for attorneys’ fees.14  
Thus, they argue, the Commonwealth does not have any legal 
ground to claim entitlement to attorneys’ fees on the basis of 
                                              
12 See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605, 610 (2001). 
13 650 F.3d 223, 228-29 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
14 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). 
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the injunction (or the merger termination that it prompted) in 
this case.   
 
We ultimately agree with Hershey and Pinnacle.  We 
will therefore assume without deciding that the 
Commonwealth is a prevailing party, leaving for another day 
the questions of whether the Supreme Court’s rejection of the 
catalyst theory controls claims for fees under Section 16 of 
the Clayton Act and whether a preliminary injunction entered 
pursuant to that section can constitute relief “on the merits.”  
Our sole focus here is to examine the Commonwealth’s claim 
that it has a statutory basis to be awarded its fees. 
 
IV. 
We conclude that it does not.  The Commonwealth 
claims attorneys’ fees under Section 16 of the Clayton Act.  
The District Court noted that, in ordering the injunction, our 
Court “solely applied the standard outlined by Section 13(b) 
of the FTC Act.”15  And, as noted above, Section 13(b) of the 
FTC Act makes no provision for attorneys’ fees.  The District 
Court nevertheless determined that the Commonwealth was 
potentially entitled to fees under Section 16 of the Clayton 
Act because the Commonwealth referenced that section when 
it joined with the FTC to seek a preliminary injunction 
against Hershey and Pinnacle,16 and policy and Supreme 
Court precedent supported the allowance of fees. 
 
                                              
15 Hershey III, 2017 WL 1954398, at *2.   
16 Id. at *3.   
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The District Court’s initial conclusion that we ordered 
the injunction under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act and not 
Section 16 of the Clayton act was correct, and its inquiry 
should have ended there.  The strongest indication that the 
injunction rested solely on Section 13(b) of the FTC Act was 
the standard that we used in ordering that injunction.  When 
considering requests for injunctive relief under Section 16 of 
the Clayton Act, courts generally apply the traditional four-
part preliminary injunction standard that includes a 
consideration of:  (1) the likelihood of success on the merits; 
(2) the threat of irreparable harm in the absence of an 
injunction; (3) the possibility of substantial harm to other 
interested parties; and (4) the public interest.17  In ordering 
the injunction in Hershey II, we referenced the “traditional 
equity standard for injunctive relief,”18 but we did not use it.  
Instead, we determined that the standard governing 
injunctions under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act is different, 
and we went on to apply that different standard.19 
 
In particular, and drawing directly from the statute, we 
said that the question of preliminary injunctive relief under 
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act is resolved by “weighing the 
equities and considering the Commission’s likelihood of 
ultimate success” to determine whether “such action would be 
in the public interest.”20  In doing so, we emphasized that the 
                                              
17 See Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 285-86 (3d Cir. 2018) 
cert. denied 139 S. Ct. 440 (2018); see also Julian O. von 
Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulations § 
172.02[3][b] & n.60 (2d ed. 2018) (collecting cases). 
18 Hershey II, 838 F.3d at 337. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)).   
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public interest standard in the second prong of this analysis 
differs from “the traditional equity standard for injunctive 
relief.”21  This assessment aligns with the judgment of other 
Courts of Appeals, which have concluded that the Section 
13(b) standard is not only different from, but easier to satisfy 
than the traditional standard for injunctive relief that courts 
apply to claims under Section 16 of the Clayton Act.22 
   
In sum, in ordering the injunction on which the 
Commonwealth relies, we expressly applied Section 13(b) of 
the FTC Act and its lower evidentiary bar instead of Section 
16 of the Clayton Act.  Thus, to the extent that the 
Commonwealth can be said to have “prevailed,” it did so 
under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act and not Section 16 of the 
Clayton Act.  For similar reasons, the only court of which we 
are aware to have addressed the issue has concluded that an 
injunction issued under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act does 
not trigger potential entitlement to attorneys’ fees under 
                                              
21 Id.   
22 See, e.g., FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 714 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (explaining that Congress, in drafting Section 
13(b), “intended th[e Section 13(b)] standard to depart from . 
. . the then-traditional equity standard” so that the FTC “was 
not held to the high thresholds applicable where private 
parties seek interim restraining orders”) (quotation marks 
omitted); FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 
1233 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that Section 13(b) “places a 
lighter burden on the Commission than that imposed on 
private litigants by the traditional equity standard”)(quotation 
marks omitted). 
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Section 16 of the Clayton Act.23  We agree with that 
conclusion. 
 
The District Court relied on a number of factors in 
concluding otherwise, but none is persuasive.  The District 
Court first pointed to the legislative history of the Clayton 
Act to justify its relevance here.  It noted that “Congress 
intended that an individual plaintiff should not bear ‘the very 
high price of obtaining judicial enforcement of . . . the 
antitrust laws.’”24  However, we have examined the extensive 
history of this Act and find nothing that clearly shows 
Congress’s intent to empower us to extend the fee-shifting 
provision of the Clayton Act to cover an action for injunctive 
relief under another statute.25  As a result, we are not 
persuaded that the legislative history of the Clayton Act 
supports the District Court’s conclusion. 
 
The District Court also cited Supreme Court precedent, 
Maher v. Gagne,26 for the proposition that the fee-shifting 
provisions of one statute can apply to pendent claims brought 
under other statutes.  Maher, however, does not support 
                                              
23 See FTC v. Staples, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4-5 (D.D.C. 
2017). 
24 Hershey III, 2017 WL 1954398, at *3 (quoting H.R. Rep. 
No. 94-499, part 1, at 19-20 (1976)).   
25 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-499, pt. 1, at 18-20 (1976); see also 
Buckhannon Bd., 532 U.S. at 608 (holding that, “in view of 
the ‘American Rule’ that attorney’s fees will not be awarded 
absent explicit statutory authority, . . . [ambiguous] legislative 
history is clearly insufficient to alter the accepted meaning of 
the statutory term”) (quotation marks omitted).   
26 448 U.S. 122 (1980).   
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application of the Clayton Act’s fee-shifting provision in this 
case.  In Maher, the plaintiff brought claims under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, alleging that Connecticut’s Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children program violated Section 402(a)(7) of 
the Social Security Act,27 as well as the Equal Protection and 
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.28  After 
the District Court approved a settlement between the parties, 
the plaintiff sought attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 
which authorizes fees for parties who prevail under Section 
1983 (among other statutes).  Responding to objections that 
the Eleventh Amendment prevented a federal court from 
ordering fees against a state for statutory, non-civil rights 
claims like the plaintiff’s claim under the Social Security Act, 
the Supreme Court held that Section 1988 allows for “the 
award of fees in a case in which the plaintiff prevails on a 
wholly statutory, non-civil-rights claim pendent to a 
substantial constitutional claim or in one in which both a 
statutory and a substantial constitutional claim are settled 
favorably to the plaintiff without adjudication.”29  The Court 
went on to say:  “The legislative history makes it clear that 
Congress intended fees to be awarded where a pendent 
constitutional claim is involved, even if the statutory claim on 
which the plaintiff prevailed is one for which fees cannot be 
awarded under the Act.”30   
 
Stretching the logic of Maher, the Commonwealth 
argues that it is entitled to attorneys’ fees because its claim 
under Section 16 of the Clayton Act was pendent to the 
                                              
27 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7). 
28 Maher, 448 U.S. at 125. 
29 Id. at 132.   
30 Id. at 132 n.15. 
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FTC’s claim under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act.  But the 
issue in Maher was fundamentally different.  The issue in 
Maher was whether the plaintiff’s including the Social 
Security Act violation in its Section 1983 complaint 
disqualified it from receiving fees authorized by Section 
1988.  The theory was that the fees were only to vindicate 
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.  But the Supreme 
Court held that the plaintiff could recover attorneys’ fees 
under Section 1988 because she had alleged violations of her 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection 
rights.  As for the fact that she had also alleged a purely 
statutory violation (of the Social Security Act), the Supreme 
Court held that this did not preclude an award of attorneys’ 
fees under Section 1988 because this was pendant to the 
constitutional claims.31   
 
 But—as we noted earlier—Section 16 of the Clayton 
Act specifies that a party must substantially prevail “[i]n any 
action under this section.”32  This language limits the 
application of Chapter 13’s fee-shifting provision to parties 
who obtain relief under that section.33  As we noted above, 
requests for relief under that section are assessed on a 
                                              
31 Id. at 132. 
32 15 U.S.C. § 26 (emphasis added).   
33 See John T. ex rel. Paul T. v. Del. Cty. Intermediate Unit, 
318 F.3d 545, 560 (3d Cir. 2003) (“When the [Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act] fee-shifting provision 
authorizes attorneys[’] fees ‘in any action or proceeding 
brought under this section,’ it not only limits the universe to 
which it applies but also clarifies the type of proceeding on 
which a party must ‘prevail.’”) (first emphasis added) 
(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)). 
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different and more lenient standard than are requests for relief 
under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, and we clearly decided 
that the injunction should issue based on the standard of 
Section 13(b), not Section 16.  Such differences were not 
evident in Maher.  As also noted above, the legislative history 
does not justify extending the Clayton Act’s fee-shifting 
provisions to other statutory schemes.  For all of these 
reasons, we are not persuaded that Maher gives us any basis 
to extend the fee-shifting provisions of the Clayton Act to a 
claim raised and adjudicated under the FTC Act.34 
                                              
34 The Commonwealth maintains that it did raise its claim 
under the Clayton Act and that we acknowledged this in 
Hershey II.  It is true that we referenced both the Clayton Act 
and the FTC Act as a basis for the suit brought jointly by the 
Commonwealth and the FTC.  In particular, we noted that the 
Commonwealth and the FTC “filed suit . . . under” both 
Section 16 of the Clayton Act and Section 13(b) of the FTC 
Act, Hershey II, 838 F.3d at 333, and we also stated that 
“[t]he District Court had jurisdiction” under both Section 16 
of the Clayton Act and Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, id. at 
335.  But the Commonwealth does not have standing to 
pursue a claim under the FTC Act, and these statements 
merely declare that the Clayton Act gave them standing in 
this case.  The issue of standing aside, the facts remain that 
the Commonwealth and the FTC litigated their request for an 
injunction under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act and that we 
ordered the injunction under that section and the more lenient 
standard that applies thereto.  As one court explained in 
rejecting the Commonwealth’s claim for attorneys’ fees in a 
similar case, the Commonwealth “cannot have it both ways” 
by “rid[ing] the FTC’s claim to a successful preliminary 
injunction under the more permissive Section 13(b) standard 
15 
 
Finally, the District Court raised concerns that failing 
to allow the Commonwealth to seek attorneys’ fees in this 
situation would be contrary to the interests of judicial 
economy.  Forcing the Commonwealth to pursue a separate 
case to bring a claim under Section 16, the District Court said, 
could result in “duplicative litigation, separate filings, and 
repetitive arguments” because this would be the only avenue 
for claiming attorneys’ fees.35  We are not persuaded that 
such concerns outweigh the plain language of the statutes. 
 
V. 
In sum, we conclude that the authority for this 
injunction arose from Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, which—
unlike Section 16 of the Clayton Act—does not provide for 
attorneys’ fees.  Hence, for all of the foregoing reasons, the 
Commonwealth has no legal basis to claim attorneys’ fees in 
this case and we will affirm the order of the District Court on 
that ground.  
                                                                                                     
and then cit[ing] that favorable ruling as the sole justification 
for fee-shifting under the more rigorous Clayton Act 
standard.”  Staples, 239 F. Supp. 3d at 5. 
35 Hershey III, 2017 WL 1954398, at *3. 
